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THE NEW GATEKEEPERS:  
PRIVATE FIRMS AS PUBLIC ENFORCERS  
 
Rory Van Loo* 
 
The world’s largest businesses must routinely police other businesses. By public 
mandate, Facebook monitors app developers’ privacy safeguards, Citibank 
audits call centers for deceptive sales practices, and Exxon reviews offshore oil 
platforms’ environmental standards. Scholars have devoted significant attention 
to how policy makers deploy other private sector enforcers, such as certification 
bodies, accountants, lawyers, and other periphery “gatekeepers.” However, the 
literature has yet to explore the emerging regulatory conscription of large firms 
at the center of the economy. This Article examines the rise of the enforcer-firm 
through case studies of the industries that are home to the most valuable 
companies, in technology, banking, oil, and pharmaceuticals. Over the past two 
decades, administrative agencies have used legal rules, guidance documents, 
and court orders to mandate that private firms in these and other industries 
perform the duties of a public regulator. More specifically, firms must write 
rules in their contracts that reserve the right to inspect third parties. When they 
find violations, they must pressure or punish the wrongdoer. This form of 
governance has important intellectual and policy implications. It imposes more 
of a public duty on the firm, alters corporate governance, and may even reshape 
business organizations. It also gives resource-strapped regulators promising 
tools. If designed poorly, however, the enforcer-firm will create an expansive 
area of unaccountable authority. Any comprehensive account of the firm or 
regulation must give a prominent role to the administrative state’s newest 
gatekeepers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2018, Facebook Chairman and CEO Mark Zuckerberg faced senators on 
national television regarding conduct that prompted the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) to seek its largest ever fine.1 The main issue was not what 
Facebook did directly to its users. Instead, the hearing focused on the social 
network’s failure to restrain third parties. Most notably, the political consulting 
firm Cambridge Analytica accessed millions of users’ accounts in an effort to 
support election candidates.2 Before Zuckerberg’s Senate testimony, the FTC 
had already sued Google and Amazon to force them to monitor third parties for 
privacy violations and in-app video game purchases by children that sometimes 
reached in the thousands of dollars.3 In other words, the FTC is requiring large 
                                                 
1 Cecilia Kang, A Facebook Settlement With the F.T.C. Could Run Into the Billions, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 15, 2019, at B6. 
2 Katy Steinmetz, Mark Zuckerberg Survived Congress. Now Facebook Has to Survive the 
FTC, Time (Apr. 13, 2018, 12:42 PM) https://time.com/5237900/facebook-ftc-privacy-data-
cambridge-analytica/.  
3 See F.T.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C14-1038-JCC, 2016 WL 10654030, at *8 (W.D. 
Wash. July 22, 2016) (finding Amazon accountable for in-app charges); Agreement Containing 
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technology companies to act in ways traditionally associated with public 
regulators—by policing other businesses for legal violations.  
Over time policy makers have enlisted a large array of private actors in their 
quest for optimal regulatory design.4 Scholarship on the private role in public 
governance has focused on third-party enforcers whose main function is to 
provide a support service. Those enforcers include self-regulatory organizations 
formed by industry and independent auditors mandated by regulators.5 The 
corporate law strand of this enforcement literature emphasizes a network of 
“gatekeepers,” such as lawyers, accountants, and certifiers who guard against 
compliance and governance failures.6 For instance, before releasing annual 
reports a publicly traded company must obtain the signoff of a certified 
accountant.7 In these more familiar private enforcement contexts, the private 
                                                 
Consent Order at 5, In the Matter of Google Inc. No. 102-3136, (F.T.C. March 30, 2011), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/03/110330googlebuzzagreeorder.
pdf (ordering Google to require “service providers by contract to implement and maintain 
appropriate privacy protections.”). 
4 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation As Delegation: Private Firms, 
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 Duke L.J. 377, 453 (2006) 
(conceiving of regulators’ decisions to let regulated entities fill in vague mandates as delegation); 
Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 Law & Soc’y Rev. 691 (2003) (describing the 
“intertwining of the public and private sectors”); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public 
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 549–56 (2000) (surveying the great diversity of private 
governance actors); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1367, 
1369 (2003) (conceiving of privatization of health care, welfare provision, prisons, and public 
education as delegation); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the 
New Religion, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1229, 1237–42 (2003) (exploring implications of privatization 
for public values). 
5 Bamberger, supra note 4, at 452–58; Freeman, supra note 4, at 635, 644. As another 
example, in policing stock exchanges, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) relies 
heavily on self-regulatory organizations to monitor wrongdoing and propose rules. Jennifer M. 
Pacella, If the Shoe of the SEC Doesn’t Fit: Self-Regulatory Organizations and Absolute 
Immunity, 58 Wayne L. Rev. 201, 202 (2012) . Courts also order third-party monitors. See 
Veronica Root, The Monitor-“Client” Relationship, 100 Va. L. Rev. 523, 531–33 (2014). 
6 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance (2006) 
(chronicling the evolution of auditors, attorneys, securities analysts, and credit-rating agencies 
in guarding against corporate governance failures); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 53, 107 (2003) (discussing the need to expand gatekeeper liability in the wake of 
the Enron fraud scandal); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party 
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 53, 54 (1986) (contrasting whistleblowers with 
gatekeepers, which are third parties who can “prevent misconduct by withholding support.”). 
7 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2018) (“Every issuer of a security . . . shall file with the 
Commission . . . such annual reports (and such copies thereof), certified if required by the rules 
and regulations of the Commission by independent public accountants . . . .”).  
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“cops on the beat”8 are ancillary actors rather than core market participants.9 
This Article demonstrates how policymakers have enlisted a new class of 
more powerful third-party enforcers: the businesses at the heart of the economy. 
The ten largest American companies by valuation operate in information 
technology, finance, oil, and pharmaceuticals.10 A regulator has put leading 
firms in each of these industries on notice about their responsibilities for third-
party oversight.11 In addition to the FTC, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA)—along with the Department of Justice (DOJ)—requires BP Oil and other 
energy companies to audit offshore oil platform operators for environmental 
compliance.12 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) expects Pfizer and 
other drug companies to ensure suppliers and third-party labs follow the 
agency’s health and safety guidelines.13  The Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) orders financial institutions, such as American Express, to 
monitor independent debt collectors and call centers for deceptive practices.14 
                                                 
8 Kraakman, supra note 6, at 53 n.1 (attributing to Jeremy Bentham the “cop on the beat” 
metaphor and using it to describe gatekeepers).  
9 The literature has also extensively analyzed self-regulation as part of a broader new 
governance that arose in recent decades. Administrative agencies now pursue collaborative and 
responsive models of public governance designed to encourage the business sector to self-
regulate. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (1992); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative 
State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 4 (1997). Additionally, large businesses have dramatically grown 
their compliance departments to police the firm from within. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Corporate 
Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2075, 2077 (2016); Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 
571, 572 (2005); Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 
1003, 1004 (2017) . This important and nascent literature on corporate compliance has remained 
focused on the firm’s role in overseeing internal operations, or on traditional gatekeepers doing 
so. 
10 Fortune 500 List, Fortune (updated Mar. 29, 2018), 
http://fortune.com/fortune500/list/filtered?sortBy=mktval (identifying the ten most valuable 
American companies as Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway, Facebook, 
JPMorgan Chase, Johnson & Johnson, Exxon Mobile, and Bank of America). One of these 
companies, Berkshire Hathaway, is a conglomerate operating in diverse industries, including 
finance, while Johnson & Johnson sells pharmaceuticals in addition to consumer goods. 
Berkshire Hathaway, Fortune (updated Mar. 29, 2018), 
https://fortune.com/fortune500/2018/berkshire-hathaway/Johnson & Johnson, Fortune (updated 
Mar. 29, 2018), https://fortune.com/fortune500/2018/johnson-johnson/.  
11 See infra Part II 
12 Consent Decree Among Defendant BP Exploration & Production Inc., the United States 
of America, and the States of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, at 32–33, In 
re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL 
No. 2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 2015). 
13 21 C.F.R. § 211.22(a) (2018) (explaining best practices for quality control of contractors); 
Letter from FDA Office of Regulatory Affairs to Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc. (Sept. 5, 
2017), https://www.fda.gov/iceci/enforcementactions/warningletters/2017/ucm574981.htm. 
14 Joint Consent Order, In the Matter of Am. Express Centurion Bank, No. FDIC-12-315b, 
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The widespread conscription of businesses as enforcers—also called 
“enforcer-firms” below—shares characteristics with but differs meaningfully 
from prior iterations of third-party regulation. For instance, the FTC’s original 
court order required Facebook to hire a third-party auditor—an example of the 
old gatekeeper model–to certify Facebook’s compliance.15 In that arrangement, 
refusing to sign off on Facebook’s biennial reports to the FTC constituted the 
auditor’s main sanction.16 Facebook could, however, respond to that sanction by 
bringing its business elsewhere.17 That ability to retaliate weakens traditional 
gatekeepers’ power and independence.18 
In contrast, the enforcer-firm is usually the client—or at least a crucial 
business partner—to the third parties it regulates. Its main sanction is to cease 
doing business with those third parties, which can prove devastating.19 The client 
relationship that weakens traditional gatekeepers thus strengthens the enforcer-
firm. In short, policymakers have begun relying on third-party enforcement by 
the real gatekeepers of the economy: the firms who control access to core 
product markets.20  
In highlighting a new enforcement model, this Article builds on the literature 
scrutinizing the increasingly narrow divide between private businesses and the 
administrative state.21 Although that scholarship has yet to examine the enforcer-
firm in any sustained manner,22 mandated third-party governance raises similar 
                                                 
FDIC-12-316k, 2012-CFPB-0002 (F.D.I.C., C.F.P.B. Oct. 1, 2012), 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2012/pr12114a.pdf [hereinafter American Express 
Consent Order]  
15 Decision and Order at 3–4, In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., No. 092-3184 (F.T.C. July 
27, 2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810facebookdo.pdf. 
16 See id at 6.  
17 The consent order does not prevent such a response. See id. 
18 See Joel S. Demski, Corporate Conflicts of Interest, 17 J. Econ. Persp. 51, 57 (2003).  
19 See infra Part IV.A. 
20 A diversified firm may play both a new and traditional gatekeeper role. For instance, by 
allowing a company to serve as both a commercial bank and investment bank, the law enabled 
large financial institutions to operate as both traditional gatekeepers—overseeing their clients 
by underwriting securities, prompted by liability avoidance under the Securities Act of 1933—
and as new gatekeepers, being the clients who hire third party businesses. See infra Part II.A.; 
Kraakman, supra note 6, at 83. 
21 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
22 To the extent scholars have discussed mandated third-party governance it has been in 
passing or in narrower contexts such as in criminal or international law. See, e.g., Larry Catá 
Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Corporate Monitoring After 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 327, 433–34 (2004) (referencing how the Bank Secrecy 
Act causes a larger number of businesses to become “part of the network of the state’s eyes and 
ears.”)John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies, 34 World Dev. 
884, 889–90 (2006) (exploring how domestic firms can serve as a means of reaching foreign 
actors); Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangels, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
797, 910 (2016) (focusing on money laundering); Itai Grinberg, The Battle over Taxing Offshore 
6 Virginia Law Review (forthcoming) [10-Jan-20 
accountability issues as previous generations of third-party enforcement. In 
particular, as a new area of quasi-regulatory activity unlikely to be overturned 
by judicial review, conscripted enforcement lacks transparency and traditional 
measures of public involvement, such as notice and comment rulemaking.23  
However, if designed well, the enforcer-firm offers some hope for improving 
upon prior regulatory models’ accountability. Because enforcer-firms often sell 
directly to consumers they may prove more responsive to public concerns when 
compared to traditional gatekeepers, which interact most closely with regulated 
entities.24 And because the enforcer-firm is itself a prime target of public 
regulation, it would be easier for an administrative agency to oversee it than to 
add a whole new category of firms as required for oversight of traditional 
gatekeepers.25 The conscription of businesses has proved crucial in other 
unwieldy administrative contexts, facilitating the transformation of the U.S. 
fiscal system to reliance on a previously unadministrable income tax on 
individuals.26 The enforcer-firm could, by analogy, enable the regulatory state 
to bring dispersed business actors into compliance. 
None of this should be taken as an endorsement of the enforcer-firm, which 
is too new and understudied to yield strong normative conclusions. However, an 
openness to the upsides of the enforcer-firm responds to the critique that 
administrative law scholars have too often portrayed private actors as an 
intrusion into legitimacy, which prevents “imagining the means by which private 
actors might contribute to accountability.”27  
Mandated third-party governance also speaks to vibrant corporate law 
inquiries. Scholars have paid considerable attention to the duties of directors and 
officers, personal liability for corporate wrongdoing, and organizational 
structure.28 Conscripted enforcement shapes each of these areas and pushes 
                                                 
Accounts, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 304 (2012) (referencing a “growing consensus that financial 
institutions should act as cross-border tax intermediaries”). For other ways that scholars have 
recognized that businesses regulate other firms, see infra Part I. 
23 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
1129, 1130 (2016) (“Most aspects of agency enforcement policy generally escape judicial 
review.”); Freeman, supra note 4, at 647 (“Most self-regulatory programs lack the transparency 
and public involvement that characterize legislative rulemaking.”); Lesley K. McAllister, 
Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (2012) (identifying 
accountability challenges with third-party enforcement models). 
24 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 6, at 13–18 (describing gatekeeper shortcomings). 
25 See infra Part IV.B. 
26 Ajay K. Mehrotra, Making the Modern American Fiscal State: Law, Politics, and the Rise 
of Progressive Taxation, 1877-1929, 282-83 (2013). 
27 Freeman, supra note 4, at 675. Numerous scholars have taken up this call in other contexts. 
See, e.g., Sarah Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 137, 
139–41 (2019) (calling for a holistic view of corporations’ role in promoting environmental 
goals). 
28 See generally Nicolai J. Foss et al., The Theory of the Firm, in Encyclopedia of Law & 
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against depictions of the firm emphasizing its private nature. Those depictions 
are rooted in the influential metaphor—sometimes described as the most 
dominant theory of the firm—that the firm is a “nexus of contracts” among 
owners, managers, laborers, suppliers, and customers.29 The firm remains 
exceedingly private. But by directing businesses to write enforcement-oriented 
contract clauses and monitor external relationships for legal violations, as a 
descriptive matter the state is pushing the firm toward a larger public role.30  
That insight is relevant beyond theory and institutional design. In the highest 
legislative circles and corporate boardrooms, debates are unfolding about what 
duties corporations owe to society, with some taking particular aim at the idea 
that shareholders should come above all other stakeholders.31 Conscripted 
enforcement marks a significant uptick in federal regulatory involvement in the 
firm by imposing more of an affirmative public duty to act.32 Cast against the 
backdrop of the firm as public enforcer, calls for business leaders to do more for 
society appear less disconnected from reality than would be the case under a 
largely private conception of the firm.33  
The Article is structured as follows. Part I provides an overview of the well-
studied ways that private entities serve as enforcers. Part II offers four case 
studies of how regulators have implemented mandated enforcement of third 
parties in some of the largest U.S. industries: the FTC and technology, the CFPB 
and banking, the EPA and oil, and the FDA and pharmaceuticals. Part III 
examines how mandated enforcement alters the firm’s contracts, relationships, 
and governance. It also explores shifts in liability at the personal and entity level, 
which could influence organizational structure. Part IV concludes by 
considering implications for the effectiveness and accountability of the 
administrative state. 
 
                                                 
Economics 631 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 3d ed. 2000); infra Part III. 
29 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is A Nexus of 
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. Corp. L. 819 (1999); Michael C. Jensen & 
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976); Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-
Taking and Public Duty, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 26 (2016). 
30 Infra Part III.A. 
31 See Elizabeth Warren Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders, Wall 
St. J., Aug. 15, 2018, at A17; Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose 
(2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter; 
Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That 
Serves All Americans,’ BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/9K2F-2HLG; 
Martin Lipton et al., It’s Time to Adopt the New Paradigm, Harv. L. Sch. Forum Corp. Gov., 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/its-time-to-adopt-the-new-paradigm On 
shareholder primacy, see infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
32 Infra Part III.D. 
33 There is arguably a gap between rhetoric and reality. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, 
Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1997, 2042 (2014). 
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I. TRADITIONAL FORMS OF THIRD-PARTY ENFORCEMENT 
 
A decades-long debate in both corporate and administrative law scholarship 
concerns “how best to tap the private interests of enterprise participants to serve 
the public interest.”34 Historically, the starting point was the hope that firms 
would self-regulate—if not for market incentives, then to avoid legal 
punishment for wrongdoing.35 Although scholars recognize the heterogeneity of 
external private enforcers,36 they have stopped short of examining the emerging 
importance of how large firms are required to oversee third parties. I now turn 
to those prior narratives of third-party private regulation.  
 
A.  Independent Enforcement 
 
The origins of businesses influencing other businesses for the public benefit 
lie in markets, rather than government. To see the public-private connection, it 
is instructive to first consider how the administrative state functions. Regulators 
have significant discretion in choosing which policymaking tools to deploy.37 
Their most prominent tools include writing legal rules and filing lawsuits.38 
However, as I have shown elsewhere, public regulators devote fewer resources 
to these legal functions than to monitoring businesses through on-site 
inspections and remote information collection.39 When monitoring activities 
detect wrongdoing, the monitors—EPA inspectors, bank examiners, and 
others—can respond in many ways outside the court system. Responses range 
from informally requesting that businesses change behavior to mandating the 
suspension of business activities.40 Private third-party enforcement has analogs 
to each of these main policymaking functions, but especially to monitoring. 
Independent of any legal influence, firms monitor other firms solely out of 
self-interest. For instance, when land is the collateral for a loan, banks may 
inspect the property periodically to ensure that the borrowing firm is not 
releasing hazardous chemicals or otherwise damaging that collateral.41 
Insurance companies also monitor the businesses that they insure to prevent 
legal violations that would cause the insurer to make large payouts under the 
                                                 
34 Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 
Yale L.J. 857, 868, 857 (1984) ; sources supra note 23. 
35 See Kraakman, supra note 6 at 56.  
36 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note  
37 M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1383, 
1384–86 (2004). 
38 Id. at 1384 (providing an overview of policy tools). 
39 See Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 369, 408–12 (2019). 
40 Id. at 373–75. 
41 See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 
2029, 2053–55 (2005); see also Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 1262, 
1321–22 (2013) (showing how banks influence other banks’ risk-taking). 
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policy.42 The prospect of reducing costs motivates such monitoring, but the 
monitoring advances public interest. These financial interests can push external 
parties to “constrain fundamental managerial decisions even in the ordinary 
course of business.”43  
Another type of private enforcer is the self-regulatory organization, which 
has been described as the new “fifth branch” of government but originates in 
industry.44 Workers or companies in a given industry come together to form self-
regulatory organizations. Traders formed the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), for instance, “to improve their business by excluding unreliable, 
uncreditworthy, and unscrupulous brokers.”45  
In recent decades, private entities increasingly regulated to advance social 
causes for reasons beyond protecting their direct investments or members. For 
example, Walmart imposes recycling and energy conservation requirements on 
its vendors,46 and Nike and Apple audit their manufacturing facilities to prevent 
child labor and other abuses.47 Although businesses originally developed these 
types of programs mostly in response to negative publicity, firms are becoming 
more proactive: “Firms are not merely the objects of activist boycotts. They are 
becoming activists themselves.”48 
A final category of market-oriented constraints involves certification 
schemes. Organizations offer logos that tell grocery shoppers whether coffee, 
fruit, and other products meet fair-trade and environmentally sustainable 
standards.49 Logos leverage the consumers’ desire to motivate companies to 
adhere to better standards. Solely out of private initiative, businesses monitor 
other businesses in diverse ways. 
 
                                                 
42 See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen et al., Deepwater Drilling: Law, Policy, and Economics of Firm 
Organization and Safety, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 1853, 1899 (2011); Shauhin A. Talesh, Insurance 
Companies as Corporate Regulators: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 66 DePaul L. Rev. 463 
(2017).  
43 See Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private 
Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 115, 120 (2009). 
44 William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1, 4 (2013).  
45 Id.  
46  Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in 
Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 913 (2007). But see Jonathan C. Lipson, Promising 
Justice: Contract (As) Social Responsibility, 2019 Wis. L. Rev. 1109, 1110 (2019).   
47 Barbara J. Fick, Corporate Social Responsibility for Enforcement of Labor Rights: Are 
There More Effective Alternatives?, 4 Global Bus. L. Rev. 1, 5–6 (2014).  
48 See, e.g., Light, supra note 27, at 139 (footnote omitted). 
49 See, e.g., Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of 
Current Scholarship, 41 Akron L. Rev. 1, 60 (2008); Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, The 
Integrity of Private Third-Party Compliance Monitoring, Admin. & Reg. L. News, Fall 2016, at 
22. 
10 Virginia Law Review (forthcoming) [10-Jan-20 
B.  Encouraged Enforcement 
 
Although one motivation for voluntary regulation is to forestall public 
oversight,50 the examples thus far cover situations in which private regulation 
occurs independent of existing legal influence. Policymakers sometimes wish to 
intervene but are reluctant to act paternalistically by forcing a private party to 
act.51 Without mandating private enforcement, policymakers can still influence 
private parties to regulate voluntarily. For instance, if the law imposes vicarious 
liability on the pharmaceutical company for violations by its ingredient supplier, 
the pharmaceutical company may be motivated to audit the supplier’s 
production process even though auditing is not required.52 
Another straightforward application of encouraged enforcement is requiring 
companies to release product information in digital form so that intermediaries 
can use that data to help consumers.53 Travel websites such as Expedia and 
Travelocity benefitted from government mandates that airlines release flight 
prices and times online.54 These intermediaries help to regulate by enabling a 
marketplace filled with informed consumers, thereby deterring undesirable 
business practices.55 Although legal authority made the information available, it 
did not require any private actor to use that information to regulate. 
Private parties can also voluntarily serve as enforcers by bringing lawsuits 
or alerting authorities to legal violations. Private attorney general statutes in 
many fields give citizens the right to sue to enforce public laws.56 These statutes 
may offer the plaintiff monetary incentives to file the suit, by awarding them a 
portion of any penalties paid by the offending company.57  
Rather than filing the lawsuit, citizens and nonprofits may instead serve as 
informants. Environmental watchdog groups patrol natural habitats to find 
evidence of pollution, a practice that has increased with the availability of 
powerful monitoring technologies.58 Whistleblower statutes serve a related 
function by providing legal protections or monetary incentives for employees or 
                                                 
50 See, e.g., Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 44, at 14–15 (discussing the NYSE). 
51 Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case 
for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211, 1212 (2003). 
52 Cf. Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 Yale L.J. 1231, 1255 (1984).  
53 Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 Duke L.J. 1267, 1269–70 (2017). 
54 See id.  
55 See Van Loo, supra note 53, at 1269. 
56 See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 
2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 185 (2000). 
57 See, e.g., id. at 216. Attorneys have monetary incentives to initiate lawsuits as well, which 
plays an important role in some enforcement areas. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, SEC 
Investigations and Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Comparison, 13 J. Empirical Legal 
Stud. 27, 28 (2016). 
58 See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 115, 209 (2004). 
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third parties who come forward with information about wrongdoing.59  
Scholars have also highlighted the instrumental role that contracts play in 
voluntary enforcement.60 In particular, businesses enter into second-order 
agreements voluntarily in response to or in the absence of regulation.61 Those 
agreements result from private bargaining andserve to limit a firm’s risks of 
incurring legal liability, such as from common law torts.62 Discretionary 
inspections help not only to minimize legal violations, but also to receive lower 
penalties per federal organizational sentencing guidelines.63 Without directly 
mandating enforcement, policymakers have many options to motivate 
businesses to monitor other businesses. 
 
C.  Mandated Enforcement 
 
The law can require private enforcers rather than merely encouraging them. 
“Corporate governance is often about gatekeeping,”64 which Reiner Kraakman 
defines as situations in which a corporation must obtain the support of attorneys, 
accountants, and others before taking certain actions.65 Instead of allowing an 
oil company to decide whether to hire a third-party inspection service, for 
instance, the regulator may instead write a rule requiring certification from an 
accredited third-party inspector.66 Thereafter, oil companies would no longer 
have the option of lowering costs by refusing to hire a third party. Statutes and 
court orders compel businesses in diverse industries to hire third-party 
monitors.67 Scholars believe that more of this “regulation by third-party 
verification” could help to solve the problem of under-resourced public 
regulators.68 
It is important to note that any individual gatekeeper may have only partial 
                                                 
59 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802–04; 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 922, 124 
Stat. 1376, 1841–49 (2010) (adopting Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act); SEC, Annual 
Report to Congress on Whistleblower Program 10 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2017-
annual-report-whistleblower-program.pdf. 
60 Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 155, 155 (2000).  
61 Vandenbergh, supra note 41, at 2030-31. But see Lipson, supra note x, at 1110. 
62 Id. at 2033 & n.14. 
63 But see Jennifer Arlen, The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 66 U. 
Miami L. Rev. 321, 322 (2012) (“[T]hese provisions offer too little mitigation to encourage firms 
to detect, report, and cooperate.”). 
64 Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588, 622 (2003).  
65 Kraakman, supra note 34, at 868 & n.28; see also Jonathan C. Lipson, Price, Path & Pride: 
Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary Investigation), 3 
Berkeley Bus. L. J. 59, 70-75 (2005) (discussing certifications in closing-opinion practice).  
66 See Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory 
Technique, 47 Admin L. Rev. 171, 173 (1995). 
67 See id. at 17Root, supra note 5, at 529–30. 
68 McAllister, supra note 23, at 5.  
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ability to prevent wrongdoing. A private auditor might refuse to provide the 
necessary approval for a fraudulent securities transaction, thus driving away one 
potential buyer who sees the non-approval as a “red flag.”69 However, without a 
requirement that the auditor disclose its findings, the securities seller may go to 
another auditor and attempt to obtain approval anew.70  
To illustrate further, for most of American history stock exchanges were not 
gatekeepers. In the nineteenth century, the NYSE accounted for only a fraction 
of the trades even in New York, because most deals unfolded “in brokers’ 
offices, in coffee houses, and in the street.”71 Reforms throughout the 1900s 
gradually made the exchanges more attractive through licensing and other 
regulation, and encouraged enforcement, but it was not until 1983 that a federal 
law required every broker to register.72 The old gatekeepers’ influence depends 
on the extent of the exclusion mechanism that the law provides.73  
In light of gatekeepers’ prominent regulatory role, many scholars have 
explored how the law should hold them accountable.74 In 2001, this issue 
resurfaced when Enron, believed to be one of the most successful U.S. 
companies, suddenly collapsed, destroying billions of dollars in shareholder 
value and costing thousands of employees their retirement savings.75 The swift 
downfall “stunned Wall Street” because Enron executives, alongside Arthur 
Andersen, one of the leading auditing firms, made hundreds of millions of 
dollars in losses look like a multibillion-dollar profit.76 
Despite an academic consensus that insufficient gatekeeper liability 
contributed to this incident of securities fraud, Congress’s main response, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, did little to address that issue.77 Instead, the Act instructed 
the SEC to write rules overseeing auditors.78 It nonetheless required auditors to 
“attest to, and report on, the assessment made by . . . management” of the 
                                                 
69 Kraakman, supra note 6, at 58. 
70 Id. 
71 Stuart Banner, Anglo-American Securities Regulation, Cultural and Political Roots, 
1690-1860 256 (1998). 
72 Act of June 6, 1983, Pub. L. 98-38, § 3, 97 Stat. 205, 206 (amending Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8)); Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 44, at 17–
20 (reviewing the history of exchange legislation). 
73 Cf. A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with 
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 Va. L. Rev. 925, 992, 1019–20 (1999) (proposing 
stock exchanges act as fraud monitors). 
74 See Hamdani, supra note 6, at 107–08. 
75 See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to Worldcom and Beyond: Life and Crime 
After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 357 (2003). 
76 Id. at 357, 369. 
77 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 Bus. Law. 1403, 1409–12 
(2002); Hamdani, supra note 6, at 55–56. 
78 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, § 303, 116 Stat. 745, 778 (2002). 
10-Jan-20]  The New Gatekeepers   13 
company’s internal controls.79 The Act thus made auditors into mandated 
whistleblower-gatekeeper hybrids to increase the likelihood that a public 
regulator will learn of wrongdoing. 
These diverse private actors—whether independent, encouraged, or 
mandated—operate in parallel not only to one another, but also to business self-
regulation and public regulatory oversight. For this reason, regulation should be 
thought of in aggregate terms, in light of the mix of public and private actors.80 
These actors form a regulatory ecosystem, sometimes called “nodal 
governance,” with many players supporting and monitoring one another.81  
 
D.  What Is Missing 
 
Despite widespread recognition of the pervasiveness and heterogeneity of 
private enforcement, missing from these discussions is an examination of 
mandates that explicitly direct regulated entities to serve as enforcers. Instead, 
the focus has been on encouraging or mandating that other private parties help 
enforce the law against regulated entities. In the rare instances when scholars 
mention mandated third-party governance by the largest firms, it is in passing or 
in narrower contexts, such as criminal statutory requirements that banks identify 
money laundering transactions.82 
As a result, although a rich literature on third-party enforcement spans 
corporate and administrative law, scholars have yet to connect the firm’s 
growing regulatory role to theories of the firm and debates about its proper place 
in society. Monitoring in corporate law usually refers to internal contexts, such 
as the board of directors ensuring that officers exercise their duties or that the 
corporation obeys the law.83 Corporate law scholars have nonetheless 
contributed valuable foundations, particularly by illuminating the centrality of 
gatekeepers to corporate regulation.84  
Administrative law scholarship also provides valuable foundations by 
showing the evolution and growth of public-private collaboration.85 The 
expansion of private enforcement from second-order to first-order firms not only 
raises the accountability stakes identified in that literature but also creates new 
dynamics. With more formal external oversight roles, the world’s most valuable 
companies have the potential to profoundly shape governance, markets, and 
                                                 
79 Id. at § 404(b), 116 Stat. at 789. 
80 Freeman, supra note 4, at 549.  
81 Burris et al., supra note 49, at 25 ; see also Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private 
Enforcement, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 285, 297 (2016). 
82 See supra note 22. 
83 See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996); 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985);Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: 
The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547 (2003). 
84 See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. 
85 See infra Part IV. 
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norms. 
 
II. CASE STUDIES   
 
The ten largest companies operate in four main industries: information 
technology, banking, pharmaceuticals, and oil.86 This Part considers how 
regulators handle the largest companies in each industry. The industries with the 
ten largest companies were chosen because their power and reach enable them 
to exert influence on a broader swath of the economy than would smaller 
companies. Additionally, when a prominent company is subject to an 
enforcement action, its competitors adjust accordingly.87 These case studies 
demonstrate how administrative agencies, after receiving authority from 
Congress, have delegated some of that authority to the largest regulated entities.  
 
A.  The FTC and Big Tech 
 
The FTC issued third-party oversight orders against Amazon, Facebook, and 
Google, as well as other large technology companies such as Lenovo.88 The 
greatest amount of detail available relates to the agency’s actions against 
Facebook, the subject of two rounds of investigations. In 2012, the FTC finished 
its original investigation of Facebook for violation of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act’s prohibition on unfair and deceptive acts, concluding that the 
social network had “deceived consumers by telling them they could keep their 
information on Facebook private, and then repeatedly allowing it to be shared 
and made public.”89 One of the FTC’s main concerns was how Facebook had 
verified the security practices of third-party service providers.90  
The enforcement order left Facebook’s responsibilities vague, but required 
the submission of auditor reports.91 However, in the 2018 report, its auditor, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, summarized Facebook’s requirements imposed on 
app developers by referring to Facebook’s publicly available policies.92 
Facebook also submitted to the FTC a mandatory follow-up report on what it 
                                                 
86 See Fortune 500 List, supra note 10. 
87 Griffith, supra note 9, at 2090. 
88 See supra note 3 and accompanying text; Decision and Order, In the Matter of LenovoInc., 
No. C-4636 (F.T.C. Dec. 20, 2017). 
89 See In the Matter of Facebook Inc., supra note 15; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
FTC Approves Final Settlement with Facebook (Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2012/08/ftc-approves-final-settlement-facebook. 
90 In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., supra note 15, at 5–6. Facebook has treated app 
developers as similar to service providers. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. 
Additionally, the FTC’s other agreements have signaled a broader expectation for regulated 
entities’ oversight of third parties. See, e.g., In the Matter of Lenovo Inc., supra note 88 .  
91 Id.15 
92 See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age 
of Surveillance, 72 Vand. L. Rev. 1563, 1600–01 (2019).  
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had done to comply with each part of the commitment.93 The report detailed an 
apparently extensive oversight program for third parties.94 Facebook might send 
questionnaires to service providers to determine their security and privacy 
practices.95 Depending on the answers to those questions, or merely the nature 
of the data shared, Facebook would initiate more targeted security audits. Those 
audits, which are sometimes conducted by Facebook and sometimes by a 
security firm, “assess [] compliance with Facebook’s security guidelines.”96 
Facebook uses these audits to determine, for instance, whether an app developer 
complied with users’ requests to delete their personal data.97 
After Cambridge Analytica accessed millions of users’ Facebook data to 
promote Donald Trump’s election campaign, the FTC began investigating 
Facebook to determine whether that incident involved violations of the 2012 
settlement.98 Zuckerberg admitted that Facebook needed to better police app 
developers, stating in his opening testimony to Congress, “It’s not enough to just 
give people control over their information. We need to make sure that the 
developers they share it with protect their information, too.”99 
The FTC’s enforcement actions against Amazon demonstrate a different 
gatekeeper approach. Amazon operates an app store populated with products 
created and owned by third-party operators. These apps enable people on 
Android phones or Kindle to play games, among other activities.100 While using 
these apps, consumers buy products, for which the third-party app developers 
set the prices and receive 70% of the payment.101 The developers control the 
interface while consumers use the app, including the in-app purchases at the 
heart of the FTC’s investigation.102 Amazon thus had little direct involvement in 
the communications surrounding the disputed transactions. 
Although Amazon does not operate the apps, induce consumers to make the 
purchasing decision, or set the prices, and only keeps 30% of the payment, the 
FTC treated the company as responsible for those purchases.103 It did so by 
                                                 
93 Facebook Compliance Report, In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., No. C-4365 (F.T.C. Nov. 
13, 2012). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 10. 
97 Facebook Platform Policy, supra note 89. App developers may be subject to Facebook 
audits of their apps, systems, and records. Id. 
98 See Steinmetz, supra note 2. 
99 Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg Hearing on Data Privacy and Protection, C-SPAN (Apr. 
10, 2018), https://www.c-span.org/video/?443543-1/facebook-ceo-mark-zuckerberg-testifies-
data-protection (quoted language begins at 26:25). 
100 F.T.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C14-1038-JCC, 2016 WL 10654030, at *1 (W. D. 
Wash. July 22, 2016). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at *1, *11. 
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focusing on two points of contact between Amazon and consumers. First, 
Amazon operates the online store through which consumers purchase the 
apps.104 With respect to this original purchase, Amazon did not make it clear 
enough that in-app purchases would be possible.105 Amazon’s description of the 
apps, available below the purchase button, included such information.106 
However, Amazon imbedded the information in a long description of the app 
below the purchase button and displayed it in smaller font.107 A federal court 
agreed with the FTC that the notice of in-app purchases “was not 
conspicuous.”108 
Amazon’s second point of contact was the interface for making the purchase. 
For many months, upon pressing a button that led to a purchase, Amazon 
required no additional approval.109 The customer simply received a follow-up 
email confirming the purchase.110 Amazon later displayed a prompt that asked 
for a confirmation, sometimes requiring password entry, but only for purchases 
over $20.111 Even the updated confirmation settings allowed children, in the 
course of playing a video game, to make many purchases that individually were 
under $20, but collectively produced large bills.112  
Unlike the Facebook case, the FTC never reached a settlement with 
Amazon.113 In 2017, the parties withdrew their appeals and announced a refund 
program for injured consumers.114 The press release gave no indication that the 
FTC would mandate ongoing oversight.115 That omission may reflect a new 
approach under the Trump Administration, or possibly suggests that privacy 
concerns command greater regulatory scrutiny of third parties than do monetary 
harms. Regardless, to lessen the risk of future liability, Amazon must ensure that 
third-party apps on its platforms do not deceive consumers.  
 
B.  The CFPB and Big Banks 
 
Like banking regulators focused on financial stability, the CFPB could 
                                                 
104 Id. at *1. 
105 Id. at *1–*2. 
106 Id. at *2. 
107 Id. at *2–*3, *10.  
108 Id. at *10. 
109 Id. at *2. 
110 Id.. at *4–5. 
111 Id. at *2.  
112 Id. at *2, *4.  
113 Press Release, FTC, FTC, Amazon to Withdraw Appeals, Paving Way for Consumer 
Refunds Related to Children’s Unauthorized In-App Charges (Apr. 4, 2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/04/ftc-amazon-withdraw-appeals-
paving-way-consumer-refunds-related. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
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pursue its consumer protection mission by bringing enforcement actions directly 
against third-party service providers.116 Instead, it has required banks to govern 
third parties, including call centers, debt collectors, software developers, and 
real estate lawyers.117 Tools for overseeing third parties are likely to become 
even more important given the regulatory challenges created by the rise of 
nonbank fintechs offering digital consumer financial services, typically in 
partnership with traditional banks.118 The agency has brought third-party actions 
against each of the four largest banks—JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Bank of 
America, and Citibank.119  
The bureau’s third-party enforcement policy began with its first enforcement 
action. Capital One, one of the largest credit card issuers, contracted with an 
independent call center which routed card holders with low credit scores—also 
known as subprime borrowers—to different sales representatives when they 
called Capital One.120 Those representatives talking with subprime cardholders 
had a Capital One script for how to sell additional payment protection products, 
but they frequently veered from the script.121 Some representatives inaccurately 
described the add-on products as free, even though consumers collectively paid 
about $140 million over a two-year period for the products.122 They also often 
implied that the products were not optional.123   
The CFPB found that the call center’s employees engaged in deceptive acts 
                                                 
116 12 U.S.C. §§ 1863, 1867(c) (2012) (granting third-party oversight to the Federal Reserve, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and other prudential regulators over third-party 
services, such as accounting and computation, that a bank “causes to be performed for itself”)12 
U.S.C. § 5514(e) (granting similar oversight authority to the CFPB over institutions offering 
consumer financial services). 
117 In the Matter of Dwolla, Inc., No. 2016-CFPB-0007 (Feb. 27, 2016), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201603_cfpb_consent-order-dwolla-inc.pdf (finding that 
digital payment systems violated the law by failing to oversee third-party software developers); 
Andrew Liput, What Real Estate Closing Attorneys Need to Know About the CFPB, the OCC, 
and Third-Party Vendor Management Rules Affecting Residential Mortgage Transactions, 28 
Prob. & Prop., Mar.-Apr. 2014, at 1–2. 
118 On the challenges of regulating fintech, see Rory Van Loo, Technology Regulation by 
Default: Platforms, Privacy, and the CFPB, 2 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 531 (2018). 
119 Consent Order at 4–5, In the Matter of JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2013-
CFPB-0007 (Sept. 18. 2013); Consent Order at 10, In the Matter of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
CFPB No. 2018-BCFP-0001 (Apr. 20, 2018); Consent Order at 8, In the Matter of Bank of 
America, N.A., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0004 (Apr. 7, 2014); Consent Order at 26, In the Matter 
of Citibank, N.A., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0015 (July 21, 2015) [hereinafter CFPB-Citibank 
Consent Order];  Consent Order at 7, In the Matter of Nationstar Mortgage LLC, CFPB No. 
2017-CFPB-0011 (Mar. 14, 2017) (finding “inadequate ongoing monitoring of vendors”) 
120 Stipulation and Consent Order at 3–4, In the Matter of Capital One Bank, (USA) N.A.,  
CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0001 (July 16, 2012).  
121 Id. at 4. 
122 Id. at 5–6. 
123 Id. 
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and practices in violation of federal law.124 Although the bureau found no fault 
with the script Capital One provided to the call center, it argued that “the Bank’s 
compliance monitoring, service provider management and quality assurance 
resulted in ineffective oversight which failed to prevent, identify, or correct the 
improper sales practices.”125 The settlement required Capital One to submit to 
the CFPB for pre-approval a written internal policy for implementing heightened 
third-party oversight.126 Among other requirements, Capital One would conduct 
“periodic onsite audit reviews … of the Bank Service Provider’s controls, 
performance, and information systems” and retain the right to exit the contract 
in the face of service provider noncompliance.127 Capital One also paid $25 
million in penalties, but was “prohibited from seeking or accepting 
indemnification . . .  from any third party.”128 These indemnification-piercing 
stipulations provide greater motivation for the enforcer-firm to do a thorough 
job of monitoring and addresses the problem that many firms merely “window-
dress” their compliance efforts without making a true effort.129  
In its various cases and policy guidance, the CFPB has reinforced and 
clarified these initial expectations for third-party governance. Not long after its 
action against Capital one, the CFPB fined American Express for deceptively 
collecting debts, charging excessive late fees, and discriminating based on 
age.130 Third-party service providers committed all but one of the violations.131 
Nonetheless, the agency explicitly faulted the board and senior management of 
American Express for ineffective compliance management, “particularly” their 
oversight of third-party service providers.132  
Similar to the Capital One consent order, the enforcement action required 
American Express to develop policies for monitoring its service providers’ 
compliance with consumer protection laws.133 But American Express also 
agreed to have its compliance department submit quarterly reports to the board 
on “whether Service Providers are in compliance” with all contracts, and the 
consent order stipulated that “[t]he Board shall be responsible for ensuring that 
corrective actions are taken….”134 The American Express consent decree thus 
                                                 
124 Id. at 8. 
125 Id. at 4. 
126 Id. at 22–23 (requiring also that any subsequent changes to this policy must obtain CFPB 
approval). 
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 21. 
129 Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 
81 Wash. U. L.Q. 487 (2003) (discussing compliance window-dressing). 
130 American Express Consent Order, supra note 14, at 3–4(alleging misrepresentation 
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helped to put the industry on notice that the CFPB would expect the board of 
directors to engage actively in the oversight of third parties. 
Several years later, the CFPB went after a bigger target for its failure to 
oversee third parties: Citibank, one of the four largest U.S. banks.135 Presumably 
aware of the Capital One enforcement action,136 Citibank went further than 
simply providing a script by also reviewing recorded telemarketer calls.137 The 
telemarketing firm knew, however, which calls would be later reviewed for legal 
compliance and used a misleading sales script only for unmonitored calls.138 The 
CFPB ordered Citibank to adopt third-party oversight reforms and pay a $35 
million penalty.139 The Citibank action illustrates how having an oversight 
system in place is not enough—the oversight must produce results. 
A rare case that went to trial produced more details about third-party 
governance setups. The court order required the British multi-national bank 
HSBC to audit samples of contracts between third-party service providers and 
customers, to ensure that those documents comply with the law and that “only 
fees and costs that are lawful, reasonable and actually incurred are charged to 
borrowers.”140 Banks are also expected to oversee the processes and compliance 
departments of third-parties.141  
After four years of these enforcement actions, the CFPB issued a guidance 
bulletin summarizing its expectations for third-party oversight. The bulletin 
offers many details, including that the financial institution’s contracts and 
compliance management system must include ongoing monitoring of third 
parties.142  
The CFPB’s settlements contain more detail than the FTC’s, since the FTC 
did not specify which parties within Facebook—whether the compliance 
department or the board of directors—must become involved**The CFPB also 
plays a more active role in the implementation of such settlement requirements 
by reviewing third-party governance policies before and after they are 
implemented.143 Both agencies nonetheless rely on mandated enforcement by 
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explicitly requiring large businesses to monitor for wrongdoing by third parties.  
 
C.  The EPA and Big Oil 
 
The 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, which discharged billions of gallons 
of oil into the Gulf of Mexico in one of the worst environmental disasters in U.S. 
history, heavily shaped offshore oil regulation.144 BP Oil owned much of the 
rights to the well’s oil, but in a straightforward sense, the problem began with 
the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling platform, owned by Transocean, a 
Swiss company.145 As the platform began to sink, it ruptured the pipe connecting 
it to the well below, thereby causing the oil to discharge from the well thousands 
of feet underwater at the ocean floor.146  
If environmental regulators had applied the CFPB’s approach, they might 
have brought an enforcement action against BP alone and mandated that it 
monitor the other businesses it hired, such as Transocean. After all, BP Oil is 
one of the ten largest companies in the world and hired the smaller Transocean 
as a contractor, just as Citibank hired smaller independent call centers to perform 
sales.147 Like Transocean, the call centers controlled the specific violations.148  
The EPA and the DOJ instead brought enforcement actions against both BP 
and Transocean.149 However, pursuing Transocean is arguably different from 
pursuing call centers and app developers directly. Unlike call center operators 
and many app developers, Transocean is not a small company.150 It is one of the 
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world’s largest operators of offshore oil rigs and as recently as 2017 was ranked 
one of the 1,300 most valuable companies in the world.151 Thus, multinational 
third-party oil contractors cannot escape regulatory scrutiny simply by working 
with an oil producer that is considerably larger. 
Nonetheless, the EPA and the underlying law still placed the bulk of the 
responsibility on BP, which wound up paying close to $20 billion in regulatory 
enforcement actions, compared to $1.4 billion for Transocean.152 Policy 
foundations for this allocation can be seen in an early judicial opinion on 
Deepwater Horizon liability. Finding the Clean Water Act’s specific liability 
language to be unclear, the court relied on larger policy purpose, saying it was 
“designed to place[] a major part of the financial burden for achieving and 
maintaining clean water upon those who would profit by the use of our navigable 
waters and adjacent areas and who pollute same . . . .”153 Those who profit most 
are more likely to be valuable companies, giving them more resources to devote 
to monitoring.  
Environmental regulators do not only rely on the imposition of liability, 
which by itself has led to extensive voluntary monitoring of firms by firms.154 
Following the Deepwater Horizon incident, new regulations required offshore 
oil operators to ensure that their contractors comply with environmental 
standards.155 Regulators have expanded on those basic requirements through 
lawsuits. In its Deepwater Horizon settlement, BP agreed to extensive 
improvement of its third-party oversight, “including provisions related to 
contractor oversight.”156 Those stipulated provisions include the creation of 
Contract Governance Boards for both drilling and cementing operations, as well 
as audits of contractors.157 The settlement required the BP board to oversee those 
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improvements, as well as their ongoing execution.158 These BP oversight 
measures are separate from the various audits that private third parties other than 
BP must also undertake of BP’s contracts.159 It is BP’s responsibility to ensure 
that its contractors complete those independent audits.160 
Transocean’s settlement imposed no explicit ongoing third-party monitoring 
responsibilities on Transocean.161 The settlement referenced regulations 
imposing broad safety management responsibilities, which include evaluation of 
all contractors to ensure they operate according to safety environmental 
management systems.162 But the referenced regulations have numerous other 
requirements unrelated to third parties, and thus it would be a stretch to see the 
settlement as mandating third-party monitoring.163 Still, the existence of those 
regulations means that Transocean must, like BP, oversee all third parties with 
which it contracts. 
For oil refineries located on land, the EPA imposes similar oversight duties. 
In a 2005 case, the EPA found that Exxon routinely emitted hazardous 
pollutants, in violation of the Clean Air Act, in Illinois, Louisiana, and Montana 
oil refineries.164  Among other stipulations, Exxon committed to an annual 
“review of each contractor’s monitoring data which shall include, but not be 
limited to, a review of: (i) the number of components monitored per technician; 
(ii) the time between monitoring events; and (iii) abnormal data patterns.”165 The 
EPA is not always so explicit about third-party oversight expectations. In 
another Clean Air Act case, regarding similar violations in a manufacturing 
facility in Texas, the EPA did not specify exactly how Exxon should monitor its 
contractors.166 Instead, it stipulated that moving forward Exxon “will not raise 
as a defense the failure by any of its officers, directors, employees, agents, or 
contractors to take any actions necessary to comply with the provisions of this 
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Consent Decree.”167 Exxon is also assumed to know everything that its 
contractors and agents “knew or should have known.”168  
Even when the EPA is less directive, as it was with Exxon, once the 
agreement is in place imposing such clear responsibility for the acts of third 
parties, government inspectors can fault the company if its contractor oversight 
capabilities are found to be insufficient.169 Additionally, companies generally 
look to the larger body of a regulator’s enforcement actions in deciding how to 
implement internal systems.170 Thus, by mandating regular oversight of third 
parties in some cases explicitly, the EPA can create industry-wide standards. 
Either way, the largest oil companies—including their biggest contractors—
have been subject to direct mandates to oversee third parties involved in both 
onshore and offshore oil activities.  
 
D.  The FDA and Big Pharma 
 
Pharmaceutical companies manufacture drugs but contract with other 
companies for “processing, packaging, holding, or testing.”171 The FDA has the 
most explicit third-party monitoring expectations of the four case studies. 
Rulemaking, guidance statements, and warning letters have communicated its 
policy.  
One FDA rule states that in every pharmaceutical company there “shall be a 
quality control unit . . . responsible for approving or rejecting drug products 
manufactured, processed, packed, or held under contract by another 
company.”172 Monitoring the output is not, however, enough. The company must 
also directly monitor inputs used by the contractor, including ingredients and 
materials.173 After specifying the contractor’s internal compliance systems, the 
manufacturer should conduct audits.174 Thus, the pharmaceutical company must 
oversee contractors’ organizational processes, inputs and outputs.  
The FDA places responsibility for third-party activities at the top of the 
regulated entity. In its formal rules on liability for tainted products, the agency 
states that it “regards extramural facilities as an extension of the manufacturer’s 
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own facility.”175 It reiterated this point in its post-inspection warning letters.176 
In other words, the pharmaceutical company is responsible for the third-party 
contractor’s activities as if they were one company. In guidance documents, the 
agency clarified that it was addressing “the relationship between owners and 
contract facilities.”177  
Contractual arrangements cannot shield pharmaceutical companies from 
liability. In one warning letter, the FDA told Pfizer, the largest pharmaceutical 
company in the world,178 “You are responsible for the quality of combination 
products you produce as a contract facility, regardless of agreements in place 
with [your customer] or with any of your suppliers.”179  
The FDA does not, however, rely solely on Pfizer to regulate the company’s 
independent contractors. The FDA still routinely inspects and brings 
enforcement actions directly against those third parties. For instance, in one 
warning letter to an independent manufacturer, the FDA wrote, “You and your 
customer, Pfizer, have a quality agreement regarding the manufacture of drug 
products. You are responsible for the quality of drugs you produce as a contract 
facility, regardless of agreements in place . . . .”180 
Pfizer implemented the FDA’s organizational advice into its internal 
processes. It routinely monitors suppliers through audits, inspections, and 
review of systems.181 Supplier agreements reflect these review procedures, and 
when Pfizer recognizes a violation, it can de-list the offender from its list of 
“qualified” suppliers or can report violations to the FDA.182  
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E.  Summary of Case Studies 
 
Federal regulators have established an expectation that today’s largest 
companies regulate independent contractual parties for legal violations. Through 
direct enforcement actions or industry-wide mandates, the FTC, CFPB, EPA, 
and FDA have required the most valuable companies to monitor and punish 
third-party business wrongdoers. They serve as a new breed of gatekeepers 
because the regulated entities must now decide whether to give the third parties 
market access based on regulatory considerations.183 Sometimes this private 
regulation benefits a specific party that will be contracting with one of the 
businesses, such as a consumer, but other times the beneficiary is more general, 
as in the case of environmental protection or financial stability. 
The variations in approaches indicate design choices for new gatekeeper 
governance. In the case of wrongdoing, should the regulator prosecute only the 
enforcer-firm, or also the third party? How detailed of a gatekeeper mandate 
should the regulator provide, and how closely should the regulator oversee the 
enforcer-firm’s gatekeeping? And should the regulator develop the gatekeeper 
governance model in a piecemeal manner through cases, or through more 
explicit means, such as guidance documents and formal rulemaking?  
Though focused on a subset of industries and companies to manage scope, 
these case studies are part of a broader sphere of regulatory activity. These four 
regulators alone have jurisdiction over other large parts of the economy. The 
FTC, for instance, oversees retailers and other industries in addition to big 
technology, and the FDA regulates food and supplement manufacturers.184 
Additionally, other regulators deploy third-party mandated governance beyond 
these four industries. The Interstate Commerce Commission, for instance, 
obligates trucking operators to monitor contractual parties for roadway safety 
compliance.185 A number of other federal and state laws similarly require 
companies to play some regulatory oversight role with respect to third-party 
businesses, including health care providers ensuring business associates 
safeguard health data.186 Even if the regulatory state conscripted only the five 
largest companies it would mean a substantial extension of regulatory 
resources.187 But mandated enforcement is widespread enough to prompt a 
broader inquiry into the implications for the firm’s evolving place in society.  
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III. EXPANDING THE PUBLIC INFLUENCE ON THE FIRM 
 
This Article aims primarily to illuminate the rise of mandated enforcement, 
both its form and scope. Once recognized, however, this development implicates 
prominent conversations and policy debates. By redrawing the lines between 
public and private, mandated enforcement adds a new layer to some of the most 
fundamental corporate law questions: How should the firm be conceptualized? 
And what duties does it owe to society? 
The firm has a decidedly private core, as implicated by its prominent 
description as a nexus of contracts.188 Because the firm’s contractual foundations 
are necessarily incomplete, corporate law fills in the gaps to reflect the parties’ 
intents.189 Some scholars have proposed giving greater weight in corporate 
governance to a broader set of social issues, including employee rights or a 
cleaner environment, and demonstrated how managers have discretion under the 
business judgment rule to pursue these goals.190 Nonetheless, most 
commentators and judges see the primary goal of corporate law as advancing 
shareholder value.191  
By some accounts, the depiction of the firm as a contractually-based private 
entity helped advance the notion that government intervention in those private 
agreements is “unnatural.”192 That line of reasoning views the firm’s “market-
oriented nature” as serving “to dismiss the notion that the corporation owes 
anything to the state.”193 Of course, the firm and its directors cannot pursue profit 
illegally. Under Delaware law, for instance, the firm’s articles of incorporation 
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cannot limit a director’s personal liability when the director commits a “knowing 
violation of law.”194 Thus, the firm is private at its core, but public statutes define 
the limits. The rest of this Part illustrates how mandated governance constitutes 
a considerable expansion of that public side.  
 
A.  Conscripting the Firm as Regulator 
 
Two of the most fundamental functions of administrative agencies are 
writing and enforcing rules. Firms now perform each of these functions for the 
public good. They do not undertake these activities voluntarily in response to 
laws or market incentives, but by direct public mandate. 
 
1. Writing Rules 
 
Mandated enforcement puts the firm in a rulemaking role by compelling it 
to write regulatory contractual clauses.195 Firms’ written contracts serve as a 
principal vehicle for implementing third-party governance. For example, in its 
FTC settlement, Facebook agreed to require “service providers, by contract, to 
implement and maintain appropriate privacy protections” for any data obtained 
from Facebook.196 When the company later submitted its required compliance 
report, Facebook explained that it had implemented its third-party oversight 
through its contracts.197 In particular, it developed a “Contract Policy” so that 
agreements with third parties operate through Facebook’s “pre-approved 
standard contract templates.”198 Facebook’s legal department “reviews contracts 
that deviate from the pre-approved templates to help ensure that contracts with 
applicable service providers contain the required privacy protections.”199 The 
case of Facebook embodies a broader theme of regulator-mandated contract 
clauses. 
Consumer finance, pharma, and oil regulators also explicitly mention 
contractual requirements. A CFPB guidance bulletin states that all financial 
institutions should include “in the contract with the service provider clear 
expectations about compliance, as well as appropriate and enforceable 
consequences for violating any compliance-related responsibilities.”200 The 
FDA expects pharmaceutical companies to detail in their contracts the shape of 
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third-party suppliers’ compliance systems, and to reserve the right to audit these 
systems.201 The EPA required BP Oil to include certain provisions in any new 
contract with a drilling rig, including requiring the rig to join an industry safety 
group.202 The firm’s contracts no longer contain only voluntary second-order 
regulatory components made in response to regulation, but now also include 
first-order clauses mandated by law.203  
These mandated contractual clauses presumably become legally enforceable 
against the smaller companies agreeing to them.204 Even if the counterparties do 
not expect the contract to ever reach a courtroom, however, their terms can 
define the contours of the ongoing relationship.205 Businesses refer to their 
contracts for guidance as to their respective rights.206 Through their inclusion in 
contracts, third-party enforcement clauses can influence many of the firm’s 
relationships with external parties.207  
More to the point, these mandates infuse a more significant public obligation 
into the firm’s contracts. Motivated solely by profit and without any legal 
influence, businesses have long inserted contract clauses that incidentally 
advance the interests of consumers, the environment, or health.208 Even second-
order contractual clauses, inserted voluntarily in response to laws, still retain the 
autonomy of contracting parties and therefore a heavy private component.209 
Conversely, conscripted enforcement contracts impose more thoroughly public 
obligations because businesses do not write them voluntarily. 
Do contractual third-party governance clauses differ from other contractual 
mandates? Various statutes influence the shape of particular contracts by 
requiring them to include certain information. For instance, credit card 
companies must prominently communicate the annual percentage rate, under the 
Truth in Lending Act.210 The Uniform Commercial Code provides a default 
warranty of merchantability and imposes a duty to act in good faith.211 
Legislative limits on freedom of contract are neither new nor unusual.  
Conscripted enforcement clauses need not differ from other contractual 
mandates to mark a significant expansion of public influence on the firm’s 
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contracts. However, those traditional mandates do, in fact, differ because their 
most immediate beneficiary is one of the contracting parties. Arguably, these 
restraints advance freedom of contract, in that they help one of the parties to 
come to the agreement they would have wanted if both were economically 
rational and informed.212 Disclosures, for instance, give information that both 
parties would want entering into the transaction about the nature of what they 
are receiving—such as the full cost of a loan, including fees.213 Those laws may 
ultimately benefit the public by improving welfare through more efficient 
market transactions, but they remain more clearly internal-to-the-contract in 
terms of their direct beneficiary—one of the contracting parties.214  
In contrast, mandated enforcement can benefit parties not involved in the 
contract. These mandates require Facebook, Citibank, and Pfizer to protect 
consumers by governing service providers and suppliers.215 Exxon and BP must 
ensure that contractors safeguard the environment for the benefit of the public.216 
Granted, one or both of the contractual parties also arguably benefit from these 
requirements, by preserving their reputation and strengthening industry 
standards.217 Also, consumer-oriented protections benefit a party that will 
ultimately contract with the enforcer-firm—Facebook’s users, or Citibank’s 
customers.218 The benefits to the contracting parties are less immediate and less 
definite, however—nor do they motivate the clause.  
Congress regularly passes laws that require some administrative agency with 
rulemaking. Following the financial crisis of 2008, for instance, Congress tasked 
the CFPB with writing numerous consumer protection rules.219 By analogy, in 
the case of third-party governance, regulators arguably delegate some of the 
rulemaking authority they receive from Congress to firms. Regulators could 
write the specific third-party governance clauses that they want firms to include 
in their contracts, but they do not. This non-directive approach reflects 
regulators’ broader strategy of delegating complex decisions to private parties 
due to limited information and resources.220  
Instead, regulators provide general guidance regarding what the firm should 
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include, such as instructing Google to require “service providers by contract to 
implement and maintain appropriate privacy protections.”221 Although 
companies do not normally release the text of their contracts, Facebook’s terms 
state to app developers, “We or an independent auditor acting on our behalf may 
audit your app, systems, and records to ensure your use of Platform and data you 
receive from us is safe . . . .”222 Regulators thus, to varying degrees, let the firm 
determine how best to write that clause. In short, by writing contract clauses 
governing other private parties, businesses play a rulemaking role analogous to 
what Congress expects of administrative agencies.  
 
2. Enforcing Law  
 
Mandated third-party governance also compels large firms to enforce the 
law. In his testimony in front of the Senate, Zuckerberg was asked by one senator 
why the company had not more closely monitored app developers and held them 
accountable for violating Facebook’s privacy policies. Zuckerberg responded, 
“Before, we’d thought that when developers told us that they weren’t going to 
sell data, [that was] a good representation. But one of the big lessons that we’ve 
learned here is that clearly, we cannot just take developers’ word for it. We need 
to go and enforce them.”223 
As mentioned above, federal regulators use ongoing monitoring as their 
main enforcement tool, rather than simply bringing formal lawsuits.224 The FDA 
and EPA conduct routine on-site inspections of laboratories and manufacturing 
facilities, for instance, and the CFPB visits banks to examine their records.225 
When the federal monitors—typically called inspectors or examiners—detect 
wrongdoing, they often handle the problem directly without involving 
lawyers.226  
Mandated enforcement also emphasizes monitoring. Facebook “audits” app 
developers as part of its consent order.227 Capital One must conduct “periodic 
onsite audit reviews” of service providers.228 Pharmaceutical companies are 
expected to reserve the right “to audit its contractor’s facilities for 
compliance . . . .”229 Exxon is required by court order to review subcontractor 
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monitoring data.230 Thus, by public mandate firms must undertake one of the 
core functions of the modern public regulator. 
In implementing regulatory monitoring, private firms face similar challenges 
as public regulators long have. For instance, Volkswagen fooled regulators for 
years into thinking its cars met emissions standards through software that 
recognized when an emissions test was occurring and hid actual emissions 
levels.231 Similarly, Citibank had an oversight regime that included reviewing 
call centers’ phone conversations, but call center employees figured out which 
calls would be audited and only veered from the mandated script on unmonitored 
calls.232 Businesses now have incentives to evade the enforcer-firm’s detection 
as they long have had for public regulatory policing.  
In monitoring third parties, large firms also look for similar things as do 
public regulators. A “critical component” of modern regulation is to move 
beyond the identification of specific violations to ensure that companies have “a 
robust and effective compliance management system.”233 This means 
scrutinizing a company’s procedures to ensure a meaningful compliance 
system.234 The enforcer-firm must also look for more than violations. As one 
example, when Facebook monitors app developers for privacy, they examine 
developers’ data security procedures.235 
Enforcement must come with some kind of sanction. One pervasive 
regulatory sanction is the ability to block access to the market, often through the 
revocation of a permit or license.236 This gives regulators a potentially ruinous 
enforcement sanction, even if they rarely use it.  
Big businesses are expected to enforce using a similar gatekeeper function 
by blocking access to markets. In one consent decree, the Comptroller of 
Currency and other governmental entities required HSBC to “perform 
appropriate due diligence” of “Third-Party Provider qualifications, expertise, 
capacity, reputation, complaints, information security, document custody 
practices, business continuity, and financial viability . . . . ”237 These factors 
reflect what bank regulators consider in extending bank charters.238 More 
broadly, regulators may require firms to screen third-party qualifications at the 
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outset, and then to reserve the right to end the contract in the event of 
misconduct.239 Like public regulators, large private firms wield powerful 
blocking sanctions.240  
Despite their private foundations, corporations increasingly must play a role 
similar to the public regulator—both by writing rules for the benefit of the public 
into their contracts with third parties and by actively monitoring and enforcing 
those rules. This new role not only changes the descriptive account of the firm, 
but promises to reshape corporate governance, liability, and structure. 
 
B.  Shaping Corporate Governance 
 
Much of corporate law addresses the duties owed by officers and 
directors.241 In public corporations, the shareholders do not exert day-to-day 
control, but rely instead on the board of directors and the officers of the 
corporation to run the business.242 Fiduciary law is one of the main ways that 
shareholders can hold officers and directors liable if they manage the corporation 
in a way contrary to shareholders’ interests.243 Other civil lawsuits may also be 
brought against business leaders. This section looks at the implications of third-
party mandates for personal liability and the corporate governance principles 
that such liability seeks to promote.  
In In re Caremark, the Delaware Chancery Court observed that “a director’s 
obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate 
information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, 
and that failure to do so under some circumstances may . . .  render a director 
liable for losses . . . .”244 Subsequent rulings have reinforced directors’ fiduciary 
duty to ensure the corporation has reporting systems and controls that enable 
them to monitor risks.245 But the bar is high for such liability.246 Directors do not 
violate their fiduciary duty simply by overseeing a company with objectively 
poor compliance systems, unless plaintiffs show that the directors’ oversight of 
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those systems was subjectively reckless or grossly negligent.247  
How does third-party mandated governance alter board members’ duties to 
shareholders? Shareholders tested that issue through a suit against Capital 
One.248 Pointing to the CFPB’s aforementioned enforcement action, 
shareholders first alleged that the board inadequately monitored the call 
centers.249 The court noted that, under Delaware law, to establish a breach of 
fiduciary duty in monitoring third parties plaintiffs must show that the board 
operated in bad faith.250 Because Capital One had controls in place for call 
centers, the court found that the plaintiffs did not plead sufficient facts to show 
“‘a sustained or systematic failure of [the] board to exercise oversight’ or that 
‘the board utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or 
controls.’”251 The court ultimately dismissed the suit on summary judgment 
because the plaintiffs did not put forth facts showing that the directors 
“consciously chose not to remedy the misconduct.”252 State law may eventually 
catch up, but the Capital One shareholder suit demonstrates how state corporate 
law imposes lower duties than regulators do upon the board with regard to third 
parties.253  
Despite the lack of a strong influence on directors’ state law liability, 
mandated third-party regulation could still alter corporate governance. By 
specifying actions the board must take in the wake of settlements, administrative 
agencies are dictating concrete board duties. In its settlement with Citibank, for 
instance, the CFPB required the board to form a sub-committee focused on 
compliance, and for that sub-committee to meet monthly, take minutes, and 
submit quarterly reports to the CFPB’s regional director on the bank’s progress 
overseeing third parties.254 Regulators’ detailed instructions put responsibility at 
the top of the corporation for the ongoing oversight of third parties, leaving little 
room for the board to claim ignorance.255  
Although regulators are unlikely to prosecute officers and directors for third-
party mandates, and insurance would normally shield many from paying 
anyway,256 the mandates move business leaders toward personal liability for the 
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acts of third parties under various statutes. For example, the Federal Trade 
Commission Act holds individuals liable for a corporation’s deceptive acts if the 
individual possessed authority to control the acts and knew or should have 
known about them.257 Since many settlement agreements and guidance 
documents require the board of directors or officers to oversee third-party 
compliance and to receive reports,258 regulators are essentially ordering them to 
have control and knowledge. Some regulators, including the CFPB and FTC, 
have pursued actions against individuals for failed supervision of third parties.259 
Individuals within the firm thus may in the future face greater personal liability 
for the acts of third parties as a result of current mandates to monitor and 
influence those third parties.260 
More broadly, the mandates may still influence board members’ conduct 
even if personal sanctions are unlikely. Enforcement actions against firms drove 
the explosion in many large corporations’ compliance departments, which now 
often rival the legal department in size and influence. Those large compliance 
departments often retain some formal relationship with the board.261 The 
emergence of specific requirements for third-party oversight could similarly 
shape industry norms for the board’s oversight of other external companies.262 
Put differently, regulators are moving the bar set by corporate law’s 
compliance duties imposed on boards for third-party oversight. By requiring the 
firm to oversee third parties for legal compliance, regulators inevitably implicate 
those ultimately responsible for running the firm, including owners, board 
members, and managers. Regulators’ specific requirements for board conduct, 
reaching details such as minutes and compliance plan approval, mean that even 
boards that have yet to be subject to enforcement actions operate in reference to 
them in managing their compliance programs. Mandated enforcement may 
overcome the formidable shield from liability that the state law business 
judgment rule, and other waivers,263 have provided to the board of directors.  
 
C.  Altering Entity Liability and Structure 
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Legal liability plays a prominent role in corporate law. By some leading 
accounts, the limitation of liability is the defining characteristic of the 
corporation and has driven its structural evolution.264 Regulators’ approach to 
third-party regulation has increased the firm’s liability for the acts of other 
businesses.265 That shift in liability implicates the firm’s entity-level liability, 
which could alter the corporate structure in ways that policymakers did not 
intend. 
Mandated third-party governance could change large companies’ 
organizational structures. In recent decades, many businesses have outsourced 
activities previously conducted in-house.266 Diverse considerations drive the 
decision to outsource, including cost savings and an enhanced ability to monitor 
remote parties,267 but some scholars have concluded that one goal as lessening 
the risks of legal liability.268 Regardless of the motivation for the original 
outsourcing, the third-party service provider typically contractually shields the 
outsourcing firm from lawsuits.269 For instance, a debt collector indemnified cell 
phone carrier Sprint from “all claims, damages, losses, liabilities, costs, 
expenses and reasonable attorney’s fees” related to its collection services.270  
Third-party mandates could make outsourcing less attractive if they remove 
some of these legal protections. As discussed above, this governance shift 
already prevents many of the largest companies from delegating away liability 
for public prosecution.271 That fact alone presumably makes outsourcing less 
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attractive in terms of shielding from third-party liability.  
Outsourcing would become even less attractive if it stopped insulating the 
firm from private lawsuits. Agency law provides a primary avenue for private 
parties holding firms liable for the acts of third parties. The more a business 
controls the acts of another, the more likely courts will find the business to be 
the principal liable for an agent’s acts.272 Various other statutes also provide a 
private right of action against companies for acts by third parties they control, 
such as for unfair and deceptive acts committed against consumers.273 The more 
Verizon controls the acts of the telemarketer, for instance, the easier it is for a 
customer harmed by the telemarketer to sue Verizon, rather than the 
telemarketer. Outsourcing may provide less protection from liability in private 
lawsuits if third-party mandates closely map those considered by courts in 
determining control. In analyzing whether a third party, such as a telemarketer, 
is an agent, courts cite activities such as monitoring and editing the script used 
by telemarketers as demonstrating control.274 Yet regulators often mandate 
third-party monitoring and explicitly require the implementation of “controls” 
over third parties.275 It follows that conscripted enforcement may move the firm 
into a position of control sufficient for courts to hold the firm liable for the acts 
of third parties. In other words, the new gatekeepers may prompt a resurgence 
of respondeat superior liability. 
The additional risk of liability possibly imposed by third-party mandates 
might change the outsourcing calculus. Purchasing the service provider would 
not necessarily impose more liability. In United States v. Bestfoods, the EPA 
sued a parent company under common law liability for the cleanup costs of 
hazardous waste disposed of by a subsidiary.276 The Court reasoned that 
something more than ownership control was needed to hold the parent liable 
under the common law.277 Direct involvement by the parent company in the 
wrongdoing is needed.278  
Although purchasing a subsidiary thus would not necessarily increase 
liability for the wrongdoing of the subsidiary, it could facilitate monitoring. As 
an independent company, the service provider would be reluctant to share 
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private information with its client. Companies generally guard private 
information closely, and if the client later used a different service provider, 
oversharing information could reduce the original service provider’s 
competitive advantage. When the service provider is a subsidiary, however, the 
need for secrecy diminishes.  
Thus, mandated third-party governance may cause businesses to either 
purchase the third-party service provider or develop a new service provider as a 
subsidiary to facilitate more effective monitoring. This assumes that the firm 
believes more effective monitoring would decrease the likelihood that the 
service provider will engage in wrongdoing. If so, pervasive mandated 
enforcement could thereby influence firms’ organizational structures.  
 
D.  Strengthening the Public Duty 
 
Conscripted enforcement informs debates about what duties businesses owe 
to society. Firms must refrain from violating laws, but they usually do not need 
to take any particular action to benefit the public.279 A strong norm discourages 
“unwarranted ‘social’ obligations on private enterprise.”280  
Industry-specific exceptions do exist, however. Utilities and common 
carriers must offer cable, Internet, electricity, and gas services at comparable 
prices even to unprofitable customers, such as inhabitants of rural 
communities.281 Under the Community Reinvestment Act, banks must extend 
credit in underserved neighborhoods.282 Disparate state and federal laws obligate 
hospitals not to exclude patients.283  
Unlike banks’ and utilities’ requirements to help some sector of the public, 
third-party mandated governance is not limited to companies offering essential 
services or serving as common carriers.284 It thus reaches a broader swath of the 
economy.285 Additionally, those essential services providers can fulfill the 
mandated public act by offering their core product—even for compensation.286 
In contrast, conscripted enforcement requires a public action other than offering 
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the firm’s core product, and without compensation, thus bringing the firm further 
outside its sphere of private enterprise. 
Third-party mandates differ from the drastic growth in mandated internal 
compliance. Compliance departments have until now largely been seen as 
internally focused.287 Conversely, third-party mandates are externally focused. 
That distinction matters because mandating internally focused compliance 
departments can be seen as merely a new mechanism for requiring the firm to 
do what it was always expected to do—regulate itself.  
Although different in fundamental ways, conscripted enforcement is part of 
a broader shift that includes compliance departments, community reinvestment 
requirements, and the SEC’s expanded substantive corporate law authority 
through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.288 These and related developments have over 
time marked greater federal intervention into corporate governance and 
operations.289  
Conscripted governance adds a substantial new layer by allowing a large 
number of federal agencies beyond the SEC to shape the firm’s relationships, 
contracts, board activities, and liability. In debates about what duties the firm 
owes to society, appeals to the private nature of the firm are less persuasive in 
light of this extensive public influence. Other arguments against government 
overstepping, such as the efficiency implications of regulatory burden, retain 
their force and underscore the importance of weighing broader economic 
tradeoffs in designing corporate governance interventions.290 However, as a 
descriptive matter, policymakers are proceeding as though the firm has a duty to 
act affirmatively in the public good.  
 
IV. EXPANDING THE PRIVATE BRANCH OF THE REGULATORY STATE  
 
The central preoccupation of administrative law is the accountability of 
unelected bureaucrats.291 The effectiveness of administrative decisions is also 
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crucial to administrative law.292 Scholars have already extended those projects 
to the growth in private governance.293 This Part begins to map the normative 
path forward for integrating the enforcer-firm into the regulatory state. 
 
A.  Effectiveness of the Enforcer-Firm  
 
A central question in business regulation is what set of incentives would 
optimally deter wrongdoing. The law can influence deterrence chiefly by 
adjusting the severity of the penalty or the likelihood of detection.294 Studies of 
optimal deterrence have produced inconclusive results.295 That indeterminacy 
will undermine any efforts to draw firm conclusions about the attractiveness of 
the enforcer-firm. Nonetheless, since the enforcer-firm is a new tool for 
deterrence, it is necessary to consider when to deploy it.  
One straightforward reason for use of the enforcer-firm is inadequate 
regulatory resources. The firm’s compliance department plays a major role in 
enforcement.296 In many public corporations today, the compliance group has 
grown to rival the legal department in size and influence.297 At Goldman Sachs, 
the number of people in compliance more than tripled between 2004 and 2016, 
to about 950.298 But the CFPB has only 416 personnel in its monitoring group to 
conduct examinations of Goldman Sachs, Citibank, and many other large 
banks.299 As another example, Facebook recently hired thousands of new 
compliance reviewers, while its main regulator, the FTC, has only 1,100 
employees total.300 By conscripting even a fraction of large companies’ 
compliance departments to enforce, policymakers can dramatically expand the 
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administrative state’s regulatory workforce.  In deciding whether that expansion 
is beneficial, observers will come to differing conclusions depending, in part, on 
whether they view current public regulatory resource levels as adequate.  
Putting the question of adequate resources aside, there remain other tradeoffs 
in determining when it would be ideal to regulate directly rather than through 
the enforcer-firm. A sensible signal for when the enforcer-firm might prove 
more effective at regulating than a government entity is the presence of superior 
information or sophistication. A major concern about regulation is that 
bureaucrats have insufficient skills or information to keep up with the private 
sector.301 Observers mention regulators’ predicted inability to understand 
complex algorithms, for instance, as a counterpoint to calls for public regulation 
of Amazon, Facebook, and other tech giants.302 Additionally, since traditional 
gatekeepers do not produce the product subject to regulation, they are less 
familiar with the intricacies of fast-moving, technical industries.  
Most enforcer-firms already have greater access to information about their 
counterparties, through the regular course of business, than would regulators. 
This informational criterion also suggests that the enforcer-firm fits best with 
the types of activities already related to its interactions with the third party, or 
that “touch and concern” it.303  
To be clear, the firm is not necessarily an expert in all that the service 
provider does—indeed, a lack of expertise sometimes motivates a firm to 
outsource.304 For instance, banks have found the task of monitoring third-party 
vendors extremely difficult, particularly fintechs and others providing complex 
artificially intelligent services, such as chatbots, credit monitoring, and fraud 
detection.305 Nonetheless, regulatory understanding exists along a spectrum. 
Given large firms’ resources, talent, information access, and expertise, they will 
in many contexts deliver a monitor better situated to keep pace.  
The informational advantages speak not only to the ability to detect 
wrongdoing, but also the cost of doing so. A chief criticism of regulation is that 
it increases transaction costs.306 In highly fragmented industries, the regulator 
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faces greater difficulty monitoring all entities than in a concentrated industry 
with a small number of large businesses.307 It requires expenditures to establish 
communications, travel to the site of so many businesses, and understand 
institutional idiosyncrasies. Unlike administrative agencies and third-party 
inspectors, the enforcer-firm already is in contact with its counterparties and 
already has a high baseline level of expertise, meaning that it can spend less to 
collect information and develop expertise.308 The regulated third party also then 
spends less on transferring and explaining information. The enforcer-firm can 
thereby lower the cost of regulation.  
Regulatory informational savings are only part of the efficiency analysis. 
Efficiency would be improved if new gatekeeper governance caused the 
enforcer-firm to better internalize the full costs of its business activities. But if 
enforcer-firms responded by bringing external services in-house, it could either 
increase or decrease efficiency. If cost savings or other business advantages 
would otherwise drive the firm to rely on external service providers in the first 
place, then those losses from insourcing would need to be compared to the gains 
from increased compliance and regulatory informational savings. If instead the 
avoidance of liability is the sole reason for the firm to use some specific external 
services, then insourcing in response to new gatekeeper governance would not 
necessarily prove inefficient.309  
A further efficiency complication arises because some of the compliance 
information needed may be competitively sensitive. Amazon is notorious for 
hiring outside businesses—whether cloud computing providers, small clothing 
manufacturers, or shipping companies—and then ultimately deciding to take 
those products or services in-house after having had the chance to study them 
closely.310 By forcing the sharing of sensitive information, gatekeeper 
governance could facilitate anticompetitive displacement or takeover of service 
providers, and even encourage enforcer-firms to become inefficiently large.  
In the alternative, the sensitivity of information may cause service providers 
to avoid sharing crucial monitoring information with the enforcer-firm. If the 
monitor is instead an administrative agency or private inspection firm, the risks 
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are less concerning because the monitor would not be a potential competitor.311 
Information is the “lifeblood” of effective governance.312 When sensitive 
information is necessary for monitoring compliance, a public option or third-
party monitor may prove more effective or at least necessary as a complement 
to the enforcer-firm.  
Another risk is that dispersed regulators create problems with overlapping 
jurisdiction. There is evidence that administrative agencies with overlapping 
jurisdiction are less likely to act, partly because each feels less pressure.313 By 
analogy, the public regulator, the firm, and the service provider have 
overlapping jurisdiction. As a result, each may assume someone else is paying 
adequate attention. Strategic shirking is also possible, since the multiple 
businesses working with any given service provider may realize they can benefit 
from other businesses’ monitoring of that same service provider without 
incurring the costs of rigorous monitoring.314  
The possibility of shirking reflects a broader concern that the enforcer-firm’s 
monitoring may serve merely a “cosmetic” function—allowing the firm to show 
regulators that it is doing something, and thereby defend itself from regulatory 
liability, without actually exerting considerable influence.315 One FTC lawsuit 
uncovered email evidence that a health care industry company’s written 
reprimands of third-party telemarketer misconduct may have been all about 
appearances.316 The company’s representative assured the telemarketer after 
sending compliance emails, “I just have to cover all bases so nobody can say 
that I never told them lol.”317 
This concern about shirking indicates that the regulatory cost savings and 
sophistication advantages in using the enforcer-firm should be adjusted for any 
public resources needed to oversee the enforcer-firm. Still, administrative 
agency oversight represents another area in which the enforcer-firm has inherent 
advantages over traditional gatekeepers. With private inspectors, accountants, 
self-regulatory organizations, or auditors, agency oversight of the private 
enforcer would require interacting with additional entities. Those interactions 
would necessitate devoting agency resources to communicating with, 
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understanding, and prosecuting new institutions. In contrast, the agency already 
oversees the enforcer-firm, and could merely add gatekeeper-related oversight. 
Public accountability of the enforcer-firm is thus lower cost and more likely to 
occur than for many traditional gatekeepers.318  
A final drawback is that the enforcer-firm’s sanctions are more limited than 
that of an administrative agency. The enforcer-firm’s main sanction is exit: if 
the third party is in violation, the firm can stop doing business with the service 
provider. That punishment is far narrower than those available to the public 
regulator, and still allows the third party to do business with other firms.  Over 
time, the typical enforcer-firm may wield more substantial sanction power as 
industries become more concentrated.319 But when the service provider serves a 
large number of clients, as many do, exit becomes less harmful.320  
This limitation on the enforcer-firm raises questions about its potential use 
in peer-to-peer settings. Often two large companies work closely together and 
surely have informational advantages—thus providing the possibility of cost 
savings by relying on them to police one another. Facebook, for instance, allows 
Amazon, Netflix, and Microsoft to access user data, including the ability to read 
private messages.321 The expansion of the enforcer-firm to oversee peers could, 
in theory, decrease the resource and information gap between regulator and 
regulated entity even further.322 Peer-to-peer gatekeepers may still have a 
regulatory role to play, but such relationships depend on gatekeepers with less 
relative power. Overall, regulators may need to be more involved as the 
enforcer-firm’s market power diminishes with respect to the counterparty.323  
Part of the problem with assessing these diverse costs and benefits is that the 
largest firms remain untested as external regulators. In contrast, research 
demonstrates that public regulators’ monitoring promotes compliance. In one 
study, increasing the frequency of EPA inspections lowered pollution from 
factories by about three percent.324 Policymakers would benefit from similar 
research on the enforcer-firm’s benefits and which of the diverse institutional 
design models, outlined above, are most effective. But there are sufficient 
examples of public regulators, private third-party monitors, and self-regulation 
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failing.325 A crucial variable in any such analysis is the potentially substantial 
costs imposed on the enforcer-firm and its counterparties.  
In short, the question of whether the enforcer-firm is better than other 
regulators will hinge on factors that include information access, the sensitivity 
of the regulatory information needed, the power that the enforcer-firm has over 
its counterparty, the organizational efficiency of outsourcing, and the societal 
gains from increased compliance. In theory, in the absence of direct empirical 
study, large firms’ greater information and sophistication should make them 
more cost-effective than a public regulator or new class of private third-party 
regulators performing the same function.  
Difficult design questions remain about which party should be incentivized 
to what degree—the enforcer-firm or its counterparties. Another fundamental 
choice is whether explicit governance mandates for the enforcer-firm are needed 
beyond leveraging indirect liability, vicarious liability, and strict liability. Also, 
legal reforms could address some of the enforcer-firm’s downsides. To increase 
sanctions, the law could give it a private right of action against the third-party 
for noncompliance. Or the law might require the enforcer-firm to report 
violations.326 Greater antitrust attention to the enforcer-firm would help ensure 
it did not abuse its position and any access to sensitive information. 
In assessing the enforcer-firm, it is important to be realistic about the 
alternatives. The practical choice may not be between public monitors and 
enforcer-firm, or between the enforcer-firm and the old gatekeepers. Industry 
lobbying may block congressional allocation of adequate public resources to 
oversee a large universe of smaller third-party firms.327 Given these resource 
constrains, the real-world question may simply be whether the enforcer-firm, 
despite its imperfections, is better than no direct oversight of dispersed third 
parties. Assuming that greater compliance with those laws is desirable, the 
enforcer-firm offers a promising avenue for more effective regulation.  
 
B.  Accountability of the Enforcer-Firm 
 
A central administrative law concern about prior generations of privatization 
is that they “insulate” the government from accountability because the public 
has limited visibility or interaction with the private entity.328 The delegation of 
regulatory responsibilities to the enforcer-firm can further insulate from 
accountability. It is therefore worthwhile to consider how the public can ensure 
that enforcer-firms are promoting compliance. Three potential responses would 
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be through courts, private actors, and administrative agencies.329 
Judicial review provides a check against industry capture of bureaucrats. 
Enforcer-firms can write monitoring contracts or make enforcement decisions 
free from accountability mechanisms that apply only to government, such as the 
Administrative Procedure Act330 and the Freedom of Information Act.331 A 
concern would be that by delegating regulation to the enforcer-firm, the state 
allows large firms to write and enforce rules to cement or further concentrate 
existing market shares, thereby harming smaller firms and new entrants. In the 
absence of a clear statutory mechanism for review, one existing proposal would 
have courts hold delegations unconstitutional if the agency imposes inadequate 
constraints on the private actor.332  
Overall, solutions relying on the nondelegation doctrine seem unlikely. 
Congress must only provide “an intelligible principle” within lawful bounds,333 
a lenient standard that has traditionally proved highly tolerant of government 
delegations to private parties.334 However, courts have occasionally indicated 
hostility for “empowering private parties to wield regulatory authority”335 and 
indicated the need “to subject private delegations to a more searching scrutiny 
than their public counterparts.”336 Most prominently, in Department of 
Transportation v. Association of American Railroads the Supreme Court 
avoided ruling on the nondelegation issue by holding that Amtrak was a 
government actor, but in a concurring opinion Justice Alito observed that 
“handing off regulatory power to a private entity is legislative delegation in its 
most obnoxious form.’”337 It is thus not inconceivable that the nondelegation 
doctrine might at some point gain relevance to the enforcer-firm. 
Others have explored imposing constitutional constraints on businesses as 
state actors under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.338 The 
most relevant tests for a state actor seem immediately applicable to the enforcer-
firm—“joint participation” sufficient for interdependence, a sufficient “nexus” 
                                                 
329 Executive review plays a related anti-capture function. Michael A. Livermore & Richard 
L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 Geo. L.J. 1337, 1340 (2013). 
330 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994). 
331 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2018).  
332 On agency reliance on private actors as delegation, see Metzger, supra note 4, at 1370. 
333 See Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
334 See Freeman, supra note 4, at 589–90 (reviewing cases upholding privatization).  
335 See Ass’n of Am. Railroads v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2013), 
vacated and remanded sub nom, Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225 
(2015). 
336 See Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 469 (Tex. 
1997) (“[C]ourts should subject private delegations to a more searching scrutiny. . . .”). 
337 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1233–34, 1238 (2015) 
(Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936)). 
338 See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization, 
35 UCLA L. Rev. 911, 915 (1988). 
46 Virginia Law Review (forthcoming) [10-Jan-20 
between the private and public actor, and performance of a “public function” 
traditionally exclusively reserved for the state.339 But courts have consistently 
found that private companies failed these tests, even when involved in activities 
with a heavy public component, such as operating electric utilities and nursing 
homes.340 Self-regulatory organizations like the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA), which is congressionally authorized to protect investors, 
present a closer case but courts still do not usually see them as state actors.341  
It is worth considering whether it matters that—unlike utilities and nursing 
homes—the enforcer-firm is engaging in a public service outside of its normal 
business operations.342 While that distinction could be relevant, and deserves a 
more extensive analysis, the “protections courts afford those affected by private 
decisions, and the scope of judicial review they provide, remain minimal.”343 If 
the enforcer-firm produces similar judicial outcomes as other private enforcers, 
the administrative state has another large area of governance that will likely 
proceed unconstrained by judicial review.  
Private actors present another possibility for holding the enforcer-firm 
accountable. For some perspective, it is instructive to consider again how the 
regulatory architecture differs between enforcer-firms and more traditional 
private enforcement models. When lawyers, accountants, and auditors serve as 
gatekeepers, the entity they are regulating is the one paying their bills.344 That 
client relationship makes it easier for the firm to capture the gatekeeper—in the 
sense of influencing it to enforce lightly—because the gatekeeper has financial 
interests in keeping the client happy.345 With the enforcer-firm, however, the 
gatekeeper pays the service provider’s bills—perhaps indirectly, as in the case 
of Amazon and Facebook, by providing some crucial access to users.346 If “the 
client is king,”347 the old gatekeepers are subjects, while the new gatekeepers 
are royalty. Enforcer-firms should thus prove inherently more resistant to 
capture, and more independent, than hired monitors. 
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Moreover, in contrast to the old gatekeepers, the enforcer-firm deals directly 
with consumers. As a result, some enforcer-firms’ employees will have more of 
a natural affinity for consumers, and thus potentially some of the groups needing 
protection from the laws to be enforced. Also, consumers have a means of 
directly affecting most enforcer-firms, by taking their business elsewhere. That 
direct relationship enables advocacy, such as consumer boycotts, that has pushed 
businesses toward compliance in other contexts.348 It also at least partly 
addresses some of the concerns in the literature that the old gatekeepers “are 
biased away from the public interest simply because close affinity with the client 
renders the desired independence psychologically impossible.”349 
There are many shortcomings with relying on markets to hold private firms 
accountable. A customer can easily choose another coffee shop or store, but it is 
harder for a consumer to switch banks or social networks.350 There may not be 
many other options for digital products, and if there are it would take time to 
learn a new interface and all of one’s pictures, posts, and contacts may not be 
readily portable to the new system.351 Indeed, when consumers have little choice 
the enforcer-firm may care less than traditional gatekeepers about reputation, 
and thus worry less about the public shaming aspect of violations.352 Thus, one 
consideration for whether to mandate enforcement may simply be the ease of 
exit: the more easily consumers can switch to competitors, the greater the 
accountability enforcer-firms face.353  
Moreover, for consumers to hold the enforcer-firm directly accountable, they 
must have both visibility into the firm’s enforcement and the ability to assess its 
efficacy. Visibility implicates one of the primary mechanisms for administrative 
accountability: transparency.354 Greater transparency into the firm’s role as 
enforcer could come in any of the forms used currently for administrative 
agencies, such as annual reports on enforcement activities.355 Many firms would 
likely not release such information voluntarily, however. Public transparency for 
the enforcer-firm would depend on mandates, or alternatively on public 
regulators releasing summaries of enforcer-firms’ activities.  
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For the public to hold the conscripted enforcer accountable based on that 
information, however, people must also be able to assess its efficacy, which may 
prove difficult except in cases of extreme failure. Behavioral law and economics 
has demonstrated how consumers ineffectively weigh various shrouded 
attributes in a product, such as the warranty or fees.356 It cannot be ruled out that 
some kind of independent grading scale, akin to restaurant health scores, could 
facilitate consumer-driven accountability. Still, in many industries, including 
banking and technology, consumers rarely switch because of the time and costs 
of doing so.357 Given challenges related to information, decision making, and 
switching, consumer spending and advocacy likely provide only a limited 
additional layer of accountability for the enforcer-firm.  
These legal and nongovernmental shortcomings underscore the importance 
of active administrative agency oversight of the enforcer-firm. The CFPB 
provides one such model because it routinely checks whether financial 
institutions are overseeing third parties. For instance, as part of its routine 
examinations the CFPB found that credit reporting agencies engaged in 
“insufficient ongoing monitoring, or re-vetting” of third-party furnishers of 
credit data.358 With that message delivered industry-wide, credit agencies 
adjusted their internal processes enough that two years later the CFPB 
concluded, “In recent follow-up reviews, we determined that these policies and 
procedures have improved.”359 Improvements included “monitoring for 
furnishers that do not comply” and enforcement mechanisms such as “ceasing 
to accept data from furnishers.”360 The CFPB thus not only examines enforcer-
firms’ monitoring, but also communicates some of its findings to the public. 
This Part’s discussion is not meant to be an exhaustive list of the factors 
influencing the enforcer-firm’s effectiveness and accountability. Additional 
risks include the possibility that the state relies too much on self-serving firms 
to regulate, thereby diminishing agencies’ expertise or prompting Congress to 
allocate suboptimal resources. Another risk is perverse incentive for regulators 
to prefer concentrated industries with large companies because they facilitate 
regulation and wield more powerful sanctions, thus putting mandated 
enforcement even further in tension with antitrust.361  
More broadly, expanding the state’s ability to coopt businesses implicates 
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more universal governance problems, such as how to prevent regulatory 
arbitrage and how to control a nefarious government wielding additional power. 
Those problems help motivate many existing checks on the administrative state. 
It may be necessary to extend analogous checks to enforcer-firms, such as 
requiring the inspector general to investigate them. These and other 
effectiveness and accountability implications are ripe for systematic study.  
Overall, as a regulatory tool, conscripted regulators offer a number of 
potential advantages over prior privatization models. They present the 
possibility of greater efficiency, expertise, and responsiveness to consumers. 
Designed poorly, however, they risk creating a vast sphere of regulatory 
arbitrage out of public sight and judicial review. A crucial feature is ensuring 
that an administrative agency watches the new gatekeepers.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The public role of the firm and the private reach of the administrative state 
expand farther than is commonly understood. With large companies’ immense 
resources at their disposal, administrative agencies now direct a large shadow 
regulatory workforce. That development offers some promise of filling in the 
regulatory policing gap left by resource-deprived and technologically less 
sophisticated administrative agencies. 
Conscripted enforcement marks one of the federal government’s boldest 
encroachments into the firm by shaping its contracts, relationships, structure, 
and governance. Moreover, as a descriptive matter, the world’s largest firms 
now have affirmative duties to act for the public benefit. Policymakers may have 
thereby strengthened the case of those calling on firms to do more for society, at 
least in the sense of providing a breathtaking precedent for the state enlisting 
businesses into its service.  
Shareholders remain the greatest beneficiary of the firm, and administrative 
agencies are still the most important regulators. However, any account of either 
the firm or regulation is incomplete without recognizing that the frontier of 
enforcement is policed by large businesses serving as gatekeepers for some of 
society’s most important laws. 
 
* * * 
 
 
 
